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0Abstract: Even though the FX market is one of the most liquid ﬁnancial market, it would be an error to
consider that it is immune against any liquidity problem. This paper analyzes on a long sample (2000-2009),
the all set of quotes and transactions in three main currency pairs (EURJPY, EURUSD, USDJPY) on the EBS
platform. To characterize the FX market liquidity, we consider the spread, the traded volume, the number of
transactions and the Amihud (2002) statistic for illiquidity. We also propose the computation of a new liquidity
indicator, BIL, that solely relies on price series availability. The main beneﬁt of such measure is to be easily
calculated on almost any ﬁnancial market as well as to have a clear interpretation in terms of liquidity costs.
Using all these advanced liquidity analyses, we ﬁnally test the accuracy of these measures to detect liquidity
problems in the FX market. Our analysis, based on a signaling approach, shows that liquidity problems have
arisen during speciﬁc episodes in the early 2000’s and more generally during the recent ﬁnancial turmoil.
Key Words: FX market, Liquidity, ﬁnancial crisis.
Résumé : Même si le marché des changes est l’un des marchés ﬁnanciers les plus liquides, ce serait une
erreur de le considérer exempt de tout problème de liquidité. Ce papier analyse, en long échantillon (2000-
2009), l’ensembledescotationsettransactionssurtroiscouplesdedevises(EURJPY,EURUSD,USDJPY)passées
sur la plateforme d’échange EBS. Aﬁn de caractériser la liquidité du marché des changes, nous considérons
les fourchettes de cotations, le volume échangé, le nombre de transactions et la statistique d’Amihud (2002)
d’illiquidité. Nous proposons également le calcul d’un nouvel indicateur de liquidité, BIL, qui ne repose que
sur la disponibilité des prix de transactions. Les principaux avantages de cette mesure sont d’être facilement
calculable quel que soit le marché et d’avoir une interprétation claire en termes de coûts de la liquidité. En
utilisant l’ensemble de ces analyses avancées de la liquidité, nous testons ﬁnalement la capacité de ces mesures
à détecter les problèmes de liquidité sur le marché des changes. Notre analyse, basée sur une approche du
signal, montre que les problèmes de liquidité sur le marché des changes se sont produits de façon spéciﬁque au
début des années 2000, et plus généralement lors de la récente crise ﬁnancière.
Mots-clés : Marché des changes, liquidité, crises ﬁnancières










































Based on the trading volume activity, the FX market is, by far, the largest market in the world. Ac-
cordingtotheB.I.S.(2007)survey, thedailyspotandforwardtradingisabout1.400billionUSD5.The
activity on this market has increased sharply over the past decade: the global FX market turnover
has almost doubled between 1998 and 2007. Furthermore, the institutional setting has been trans-
formed, in relation notably with the development of electronic platforms. These evolutions have
resulted in the involvement of a much broader class of market participants treating exchange rates
as a separate tradable asset class. However, such transformations concerning the way to exchange
currencies are not without consequences on a key indicator, namely market liquidity.
This factor is characterized by three main features. First, there is an increasing trend in liquid-
ity related to the whole market evolution. Second, liquidity dynamics are characterized by strong
seasonal effects. Third, liquidity plays a key role during ﬁnancial crisis, with some market collapses
and some strong arbitrage dynamics.
Liquidity has not been intensively studied on the FX market. Several reasons may account for
this lack of interest. First, the FX market is known to be extremely liquid, and thus its study may
be perceived as useless. Second, its high degree of decentralization generates fragmentation and
low transparency of transactions which complicates the way to deﬁne market liquidity as a whole.
Third, this market trades virtually around the clock from the Asian market opening on Sunday night
until the US market closing on Friday afternoon. Finally, besides these speciﬁcities of the FX market,
the usual problems encountered to analyze market liquidity remain.
Indeed, the analysis of market liquidity may be tricky for several reasons. First of all, there is
no perfect measure to monitor market liquidity and the concept itself is quite elusive. Some prox-
ies are commonly used but, as mentioned by Goyenko, Holden and Trzcinka (2009), there is little
consensus on which measures are better and if they actually measure market liquidity. Aitken and
Comerton-Forde (2003) show that order based measures should be prefered and Idier, Jardet and Le
Fol (2009) say that the several sides of liquidity (as immediacy, depth, tightness and resiliency) are
very important to get a picture of liquidity as a whole. However, depending on the market organi-
zation, and its level of transparency, it is not always possible to implement the liquidity measures of
interest. We are left with the difﬁcult problem of choosing an accurate liquidity measure.









































0The FX market presents the main disadvantage to partially cross all these difﬁculties and again
this is the reason why only few studies deal with liquidity issues.
Our ﬁrst contribution is to analyze FX market liquidity based on widely used liquidity indicators.
Our dataset comprises all centralized transactions in FX market occurring between January 1, 2000
and December 31, 2009 on the Electronic Broking Services (EBS) platform. Therefore, it is possible to
analyze standard liquidity indicators almost since the euro area creation.
The second contribution is to propose a new liquidity indicator (further called BIL) that only
relies on transaction price series availability. This aims at further studying liquidity in the case where
only prices data are available. The main beneﬁt of such measure is to be easily calculated on almost
any ﬁnancial market as well as to have a clear interpretation in terms of liquidity costs. Moreover,
the use of high frequency data permits to identify speciﬁc events such as liquidity accidents that
would not be detected at a lower frequency.
Studies concerning the microstructure of exchange rate markets have focused on several issues.
A ﬁrst strand of the literature is devoted to the key role played by order ﬂows on the exchange rates
dynamics. Several important contributions, both theoretical and empirical, have been proposed
noticeably by Evans and Lyons (2002). As a matter of fact, one assumption of microstructure studies
is the dispersion of information between agents and the role of market frictions in price discovery
processes (as in Amihud (2002) for example for stocks). For instance, the market organization does
matter and interact with macro factors inﬂuencing the path of exchange rate dynamics. Another
strand of the literature is devoted to the analysis of volatility transmission between distinct regions
in the world. These analyses on volatility spillovers have greatly beneﬁtted from the use of high
frequency data as in Melvin and Melvin (2003) or Cai et al. (2008).
We test the accuracy of our measures to detect liquidity problems in the FX market on daily data
from 2000 to 2009. Moreover, we screen liquidity problems to better understand the impact accross
currencies and over time. Our methodology presents some similarities with the Kaminsky, Lizondo
and Reinhart (1997) signals approach that tries to predict which countries are more likely to suffer
from currency crises. Here we focus precisely on liquidity problems on the FX market: we show that
our liquidity indicators are able to identify liquidity tensions during speciﬁc episodes in the early
2000’s (internet crash, September 2001) and during the recent ﬁnancial turmoil.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the main features









































0sures. We introduce and motivate a new liquidity indicator that we compare with the liquidity
benchmarks. In section 4, we propose a signalling approach to screen liquidity problems on the FX
market. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE FX MARKET
2.1. Main features of the global FX market
Foreign exchange trading is dispersed throughout the world. As a result, there is no precise
location and no complete recording of the activity. Trading in FX markets is unregulated, contrary
to trading in other markets such as stocks or bonds. The customer market is quite opaque. Quotes
and transactions are private information for the two parties involved, i.e. the customer and the
dealer. Trading is located in three regions: North America, Asia and Europe within which several
FX markets exist. Quotes and trades take place from Sunday (9pm GMT) through Friday (9pm
GMT) on a continuous basis. The activity is related to the opening of the main ﬁnancial markets in
Tokyo, London and New York. Each market has its speciﬁc opening and closing hours even if the
FX market never really closes. Furthermore, there are some overlapping segments where several
ﬁnancial markets are open simultaneously in different regions involving a high degree of activity.
The vast majority of the trading on the FX market is concentrated on less than ten currencies. The
dollar is the most traded currency: it is involved in 86.3% of the total traded operations in 2007 (see
table 1 in Appendix A). The Euro is involved in 37% of the trading operations on the market. This
share remains the same since the creation of the European currency in 1999. The Yen and the Pound
are involved in 16.5% and 15% respectively of the trading operations. The euro-dollar is the most
traded exchange rate (27% of the total turnover by currency pairs in 2007 after 28% in 2004). The
Yen-Dollar has been decreasing during the last decade: the average daily turnover dropped from
20% in 2001 to 17% in 2004 and 13% in 2007.
2.2. Actors and evolution on the FX market
The foreign exchange market is composed by two segments. In the ﬁrst segment, dealers trade
primarily with each others: the interdealer market forms the core of the market. In the second seg-
ment, dealers trade with customers. Dealers divide their customers into two main groups: the ﬁrst









































0funds, real money funds, non-dealing banks and central banks. They accounted for about 40% of all
FX trading in 2007 (against 22% in 1998). The second group includes the corporate customers: com-
mercial ﬁrms that purchase currency as part of on-going real production activities or for ﬁnancial
purposes.
The growth in interbank transactions has sharply increased during the last decade: the daily av-
erage turnover rose from 728 billions USD in 1995 to 936 in 2004 and 1319 in 2007; the interbank mar-
ket contributed almost to one third of the growth in aggregate turnover6. The transactions between
reporting dealers and other ﬁnancial institutions knew the most sustained increase between 2004
and 2007, reaching 1235 billions USD on a daily average basis (see Table in the Appendix). Overall,
the share in this segment has doubled from 20% in 1995 to 40% in 2007. Several factors explain this
strength of the turnover in this speciﬁc segment. First, risk-adjusted returns were particularly at-
tractive in a context where FX were broadly trending and volatility was reaching low levels (Galati
and Health (2007)). Second, the development of electronic trading platforms contributed to higher
turnovers in this segment. In particular, it allowed large ﬁnancial institutions to set up algorithmic
trading systems7. Third, institutional investors with longer-term investment horizons adapted their
strategies to hold more internationally diversiﬁed portfolios. The cross-border transactions sharply
increased during the past decade: they tripled - from 613 to 1896 billion USD on a daily average
between 1995 and 2007 - whereas the local transactions doubled during the same period (see Table
2 in the Appendix A).
2.3. Electronic Dealing Technology: development and implications
Through the mid-1990s, the FX market was primarily reliant on phone-based technology. The
phone-based network of direct relationships between banks was the principal component of the
interbank market, the central source of liquidity in the FX market. During the past decade, these
interbank dealing arrangements began to shift to electronic protocols. Reuters Dealing and EBS
(Electronic Broking Services) both introduced interbank electronic trading platforms in 1993. An
increasing part of overall FX trading volume is traded on electronic platforms: in 2001, less than
40% of interbank dealing were transacted through EBS and Reuters. In 2007, between 75% and 90%
6The share of the interbank market in total turnover has fallen from 53% to 43% between 2004 and 2007, largely because
the growth in turnover in this segment was outpaced by the expansion in the other segments.










































0of all the interbank dealings channeled through these two systems. The two trading systems are
specialized in some exchange rates: the main exchange rates (EUR-USD, USD-JPY, EUR-JPY, USD-
CHF and EUR-CHF) are traded on EBS. The exchange rates involving the GBP, the CAD and the
AUD are traded through Reuters D-3000. Overall, the share of transaction dealt through EBS is
higher than on Reuters platforms: in 2006, the daily volume of EBS was 160 billions USD for EBS
compared to 105 billions USD for Reuters. However, one must note that others platforms have been
put in place recently, such as the multibank portal FXall launched in 2001 for example, in relation
with the decrease of the dealing costs for the end users. They have an increasing role in the market:
in 2006, FXall has traded about 50 billions USD on an average daily basis.
The structure of interdealer trading changed substantially after the introduction of electronic
brokeragesinearly1990’s. AsnotedbyBarker(2007), thepricediscoveryprocessonReutersDealing
and EBS differs from the phone-based model of direct dealing in several aspects:
1. Banks participating on these platforms are not obliged to provide two-sided price quotes to
other bank on demand.
2. The minimum deal size allowed on these portals is much smaller than the standard wholesale
amountsusedinthetraditionaldirect-dealingrelationshipsbetweenbanks. Furthermore, from2005,
trading on the electronic brokerages was not only restricted to dealers but broadened to some hedge
funds and some automated trading programs on EBS for example.
3. These electronic portals provide a live price stream that aggregate all bids and offers posted on
the system. This interbank price is continuously displayed to all market participants. However, as
mentioned by Osler (2008), contrary to most other limit-order markets, the FX market has low pre-
and post-trade transparency. In fact, pre-trade information is limited to the best bid and ask quotes
and post-trade information is a listing of transaction prices while traded volumes are not published.
3. FX LIQUIDITY ANALYSIS
The analysis of market liquidity is sometimes difﬁcult due to the unavailability of some data
such as volumes or quotes for example. This is typically the case for exchange rates that are mainly
traded over the counter. However, as previously exposed, trading platforms for exchange rate are









































0forms. The main advantage of these platforms, as EBS for instance, is the ex post8 availability of data
such as transaction prices, traded volumes or posted quotes.
3.1. Data and preliminary treatments
In this paper, we use a dataset provided by Reuters data tick history comprising all quotes and
trades from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2009 on the EBS Dealing Electronic Systems9. The data
concern ﬁrm quotes and trades on a tick-by-tick basis for the spot exchange rates. Contrary to the
indicatives quotes of FXFX screens, the quotes on EBS are ﬁrm in the sense that agents are committed
to trade at the price that they have quoted.
Precisely, two types of orders are possible on EBS platform: quotes and hits. Quotes enter the
order book until they reach a counterpart. Hits are orders that are directly fulﬁlled, if a counterpart
is standing in the order book, or immediately cancelled out otherwise.
The dataset thus includes all transactions and quoted prices as well as traded volumes. Fur-
thermore, we have information concerning the volumes on hold, which give indications about the
depth of the market. The traded volume is expressed as unit of millions of the base currency, i.e. the
currency appearing ﬁrst in the denomination. For example for USD/JPY the base currency for vol-
umes are millions USD. For EUR/USD the base currency for volumes are millions Euro. Appendix
B presents an example of the raw EBS dataset for only three seconds of trading on April 2nd, 2009.
The "type" column mentions if the reported information is a deal as "D" or a quoted price as "P".
Then we have the "Bid price" column, the "Offer price" column and ﬁnally the "Bid" and "Offer"
volumes. When the type is "D", the volume recorded is the traded one. When the type is "P", the
mentioned volumes are those standing at the bid and ask prices.
Concerning EURJPY for example, we have a buy initiated trade at 133.77 Yen per Euro for 1
million Euro in line 3. We have a sell initiated trade of EURUSD in line 35 at 1.345 USD per Euro for
a volume of 1 Millions Euro. In the remaining analysis, we focus on the three main exchange rates:
EURUSD, USDJPY and EURJPY, ending up with more than 1 billion observations.
8We mean by "ex post" that even if market participants trading on EBS do not have real time traded volumes on their
screens, data are recorded and available for expost analyses.
9Ito and Hasimoto (2006) analyses EBS data for EUR-USD and JPY-USD on a shorter period of time (1999-2001) and Berger









































03.2. Regional and historical liquidity analysis on the FX market
As a ﬁrst step, we consider the regional and historical evolution of liquidity conditions. By
historical, we mean that we picture liquidity in an historical perspective by considering all the data
available from January 2000 until June 2009. By regional, we mean that we separate the trading
activities into 4 time zones, as presented in Figure 2 (Appendix C), called regions of open trading
sessions. This segmentation is also justiﬁed by the intraday pattern of liquidity indicators, with a
concentration of activities on some speciﬁc parts of the day.
Region 1 considers the Asian part of the trading; region 2 is the period when Europe is opened
and the US closed. During the third one both the US and Europe trade and ﬁnally region 4 is US
only activity.
Figure 3 in the Appendix C displays the average intraday pattern for the number of transactions
for the EURUSD, USDJPY and EURJPY exchange rates. These ﬁgures display precisely . For the
three exchange rates, we clearly see two peaks related to the opening hours of the European and
American markets. The activity is also increasing during the overnight period, around midnight,
withtheopeningoftheJapanesemarket.Theseconddimensionoftheﬁguresshowsthatthenumber
oftransactionshavesigniﬁcantlyrisenbetween2000and2009, illustratingtheincreasingimportance
of the EBS platform for these exchange rates.
3.2.1. Standard liquidity indicators
Consideringthesefourregions, wenowfocusonfourindicators: therelativespread, theAmihud
statistics, the number of transactions and the traded volumes.
Spread: It characterizes the gap between bid and ask prices. We calculate the relative spread for
comparability reasons. Indeed, the raw spread has the drawback to be in unit of currency, which is
not the case for the relative one. Its wideness is directly associated with the level of competition on
the buy and sell sides of the market: the larger the spread, the more illiquid the market. The relative























































, i.e. the midpoint between the ask and bid prices. We consider "regional"
average spreads by month. Note that the "averaging" aggregation pattern is not optimal, even if it
is the only solution, since the pattern is smoothed and may not reveal punctual illiquidity problems
over time. Graphs are reported in appendix D.
Figure 4 shows that EURJPY has the highest spread, followed by USDJPY and EURUSD. Look-
ing at the broad evolution, we note, for all currencies, a decreasing trend indicating that liquidity
improves over the sample. Looking at the regional patterns, region 4 presents the strongest liquidity
problems. Nevertheless, this region is also the one that shows the fastest decrease to a low spread
level with some kind of convergence to the level usually observed in regions 2 and 3, i.e. Europe
and US opening times.
Indeed, for all currencies it appears that Regions 2 and 3 are the most immune against liquidity
problems. This is not surprising since it corresponds to business hours both in Europe and in the
United States. Not surprisingly, Region 1 - the Asian opening time period, is the only region that
change from active (USDJPY) to quiet (EURJPY, EURUSD) depending on the currency pair. Obvi-
ously, the end of the period is particularly marked by the 2008 crisis with peaks in spreads for all
regions and all the exchange rates. Such a general increase, for all the regions and exchange rates,
could suggest that the liquidity problems are broad-based and not region-speciﬁc.
Number of transactions and volumes: The number of transactions has been often used as a
proxy for the traded volume as far as volume data were not available. Over the sample, the most
active currency pair is the EURUSD with around 300 000 transactions per month10, followed by the
USDJPY with 220 000, and the EURJPY with 100 000 (see Figure 5). The number of transactions is
the highest for the Regions 2 and 3 which correspond to the opening-time of Europe and the United
States. However, even during the overnight period, the activity on EURUSD remains important as
the number of transactions during the regions 1 and 4 is around 40 000 on average per month.
If the volume per trade is stable, the number of transactions is a good proxy for volume. How-
ever, some variations in the traded volumes, with the alternation of periods with large and small
traded volumes, i.e. when investors need to split orders for example, make volume per trade com-
plementary and essential to really capture market liquidity. As we can see in Figuresß 5 and 6, if
the two indicators show very similar patterns, some differences appear like in regions 2 and 3 for
10This 300 000 transactions per month is the sum of the number of transactions per month of the four regions (Region 1 :










































The number of transaction and the traded volume are linked to market depth and consider how
markets are able to absorb large transactions without implying a huge price impact.
Based on these measures, EURUSD is ranked ﬁrst, followed by USDJPY and EURJPY11. Overall,
we note an increase in traded volume in all regions and for all currencies. However, these upward
trends seem to have reach a peak in 2008 and we observe a sharp decrease then coupled with higher
volatilities. This decrease is relatively strong whatever is the region considered. In particular, even
for regions 2 and 3, the supposed most liquid ones, we observe such problems.
Amihud ILLIQ: Amihud (2002) proposes an indicator of liquidity based on daily returns and
traded volumes. This indicator is perceived as an aggregated price impact measure, such that the















￿ ￿ is the absolute return value and Vi,d,m is the volume in dollars for day d in month m for
the currency pair i. This indicator is computed monthly for each of the currency pair. It represents
the price variations per traded unit of assets or the impact of a trade given the market depth. To
compare the statistics between the three currencies, we convert the raw statistics - the return per
volume in the reference currency - in return modiﬁcations by Millions Euro.
The Amihud indicator, plotted in Figure 7 conﬁrms previous results. It is the highest for EU-
RJPY followed by USDJPY and ﬁnally EURUSD the most liquid one (see Figures in Appendix D).
The EURJPY shows a clear downward trend between 2000 and 2007, in particular in the less liquid
region. Such a downward trend is also observed to a lesser extent for the two other exchange rates.
Similarly to the spread, there is a clear difference between regions, indicating that the price impact is
higher in the segments where some ﬁnancial markets are closed: for instance, the ILLIQ measure is
important, and has a greater volatility, in regions 1 and 4 for the EURUSD, i.e., during the overnight
period in Europe. We also observe a sharp rise in the ILLIQ indicator for the different exchange
rates in 2008 in relation with the ﬁnancial crisis.
11Note that for comparison purposes, all the volumes have been converted in euro at the exchange rate prevailing at the









































03.2.2. Understanding these indicators
To summarize, following the four indicators we come to the conclusion that the most liquid
regions are regions 2 and 3. The most illiquid one is region 4 followed by region 1. However, each
of them show peaks at different dates. Their volatility can be rather different and the ranking they
propose can also change with the indicator. In fact, these four standard indicators are imperfect
proxies for market liquidity. Moreover, they do not all represent market liquidity, but some of them
represent also market illiquidity. This depends on the deﬁnition and even sometimes on the period.
For example, the number of trades can both represent market liquidity and illiquidity. Let consider
a rise in the number of transactions. This may come from the fact that investors, fearing a high
liquidity risk and a high price impact, are splitting their orders. Another possible explanation is that
there are more liquidity providers on the market so that liquidity is increasing. A third explanation
would be that some traders are actively using private information to trade on this market, so that
they are liquidity consumers. This simple example shows how these indicators may be ambiguous.
This is conﬁrmed by the correlations between the indicators given in Tables in Appendix E: they
vary in level but also in signs.
In our cases, we observe that spread is positively related with ILLIQ and negatively related to
the volumes for the three exchange rates. However, it is not clear that higher spreads mean less
transactions. The correlation between Srelative
i,t and Vi,t is typically negative whereas the correlation
between Srelative
i,t and Ni,t is sign varying, ranging from -0.17 to 0.26. The traded volumes, for example
are also negatively correlated with ILLIQ, so that high traded volumes contribute to lowering the
price impact. Finally, the relation between the number of trades and volumes is positive and ranges
from 0.77 for the EURUSD to 0.98 for the EURJPY.
This simple analysis clearly shows the importance of crossing the several market liquidity di-
mensions. However, data availability is often an obstacle to such analysis. If price data are usually
available, volume data are rare. At a disaggregated level, volume data is even scarcer. ILLIQ is a
response to this scarcity of intraday volume, since it is originally proposed for daily data, but still
need data on volume. However, it seems that the analysis based on daily data does not allow to
identify properly liquidity accidents. Intraday data appears to be necessary in order to get a good









































03.3. A new liquidity indicator
3.3.1. Motivation
Liquidity is deﬁned as the ability to trade fast large volumes with a small price impact. As
such, liquidity is usually associated with four market characteristics known as immediacy, depth,
tightness and resiliency (see Idier, Jardet and Le Fol (2009)). "Immediacy" mainly considers time and
delay between transactions or quotes so that all transaction data are needed. "Depth" considers the
ability of the market to absorb traded volumes without a signiﬁcant impact on market dynamics.
In order to do so, many authors consider volume related indicators (e.g. volume per trade, global
turnover, or VNET from Engle and Lange (2001)). "Tightness" is associated with trading cost related
to the existence of bid-ask spreads reﬂecting information asymmetries, inventory constraints, or
some discounts linked to some need for immediacy. Finally, "Resiliency" considers the price impact
of transactions and is usually captured by volatility measures and bid-ask spread variations.
If this deﬁnition is commonly accepted there is no consensus on how liquidity should be mea-
sured (see Goyenko et al. (2009)). A good liquidity measure is for sure a measure that is simple to
implement on any market and to aggregate at any frequency. This measure should also be easy to
translate into cost. Spread measures are quite appealing in that respect but as mentioned before they
do not aggregate easily and are related to the size of the Tick, that may differ between markets and
assets. Moreover, it is common knowledge that spreads do not only widen due to liquidity problems
but also due to information asymmetries. As mentioned by Acharya and Pedersen (2005) the spread
is a good measure of the cost of selling only a small number of the asset. Concerning the ILLIQ
measure, these authors explained that it does not measure directly the cost of trade.
Here, we propose a new measure that meets all the criteria. Our indicator is:
￿ based on transaction prices that are available on any market;
￿ a sum of returns and as such can easily be aggregated to any frequency;
￿ a measure of market resiliency and/or temporary price impact. It is a cost when we disregard
information price moves to concentrate on liquidity price moves.
Moreover, our indicator corresponds to what Grossman and Miller (1988) call "the price of im-
mediacy" and represent their measure of illiquidity. In this model, investors hold securities but have









































0time because of a liquidity event, the price will drop to attract buyers even though the cash ﬂows of
the security is unchanged. This drop in price will attract new buyers that will supply the missing
liquidity. These investors are called suppliers of liquidity in Grossman and Miller (1988) or liquidity
arbitragers in Darolles, Le Fol, Mero (2010). They supply liquidity to cash the liquidity premium
later on by liquidating their positions. In markets where there is a large supply of immediacy, the
arrival of a large number of sellers has little or no impact on prices. Markets that are liquid are mar-
kets where the price of immediacy is low. Grossman and Miller (1988) and Darolles, Le Fol and Mero
(2010) show that this price impact - due to a temporary order imbalance - is usually compensated
within a day or less. It depends on the temporary order imbalance, the risk of having a new piece of
information hitting the market before the liquidity problem resolution and the number of liquidity
arbitragers. In their model, information has an impact on prices at any frequency while the impact of
illiquidity is only observable at an intraday frequency: the daily price impact of illiquidity vanishes
out. However, suppliers of immediacy have limited capital and/or their actions might be restricted
by regulation eventually inducing a long lasting illiquidity problem and creating serial correlation
in liquidity.
3.3.2. Déﬁnition
Our new indicator, called BIL, considers only price impacts that are reversed within a period




























tn are the sums of positive and negative
tick-by-tick returns respectively over period t. rt is the daily return assumed to be the information
horizon. BIL is a positive or zero. The idea behind this formula is relatively simple. BIL focuses
on the price variations that are compensated throughout the day, i.e. all variations not induced by
information arrivals12. We assume the information to be represented by the entire period return rt,
i.e. the permanent change in price over the day. This approach is closely related to the approach
found in the literature concerning realized volatility. While sampling methods to compute realized
12Figure8inAppendixFdisplaysasimpleillustrationoftheintra-periodvariationsthatareconsideredinordertocompute
this indicator. In this example, the entire period return rt is positive, as a consequence, we consider the negative intra-periods









































0volatility aims at eliminating the price variation due to the microstructure noise, the aim of BIL
is to keep everything else but the information cumulated in rt. In other words, it represents the
"tatonnement" process to converge to the true price of the asset, i.e. the mispricing or the additional
cost paid by market participants due to missing liquidity. The more the price is diverging to ﬁnally
go to the true value of the asset, the higher the BIL indicator. One key underlying assumption is
that the asset converges to its true value by the end of the day. Moreover, we could consider this




























t is the number of intra-returns for day t in a particular region and rt the daily return.
The BIL indicator measures the degree of market frictions. The more illiquid the market, the
larger the temporary variations due to market frictions, and the larger the value of the BIL.
Moreover one additional advantage of this is that BIL is directly comparable between assets
denominated in different currencies since it represents the "inefﬁcient" returns per trade to converge
to the true value of the asset.
3.3.3. Application to exchange rate data and comparisons
The suggested indicator aggregates out very easily to any frequency by just summing up the
days t. For a given month, based on every transaction, the monthly indicator is the sum of the daily
ones. The day still being the information horizon, the monthly BIL is the aggregation of all daily






where Dm is the total number of trading days in a given month13. For instance, any BIL close to zero
means that every price variation is part of the price discovery process, while any positive BIL means
that the price discovery process is blurred by the liquidity process. Obviously, the ability to ﬁlter
between the information and liquidity process relies on the hypothesis of information revelation
horizons. Here, we take the day as the information revelation horizon. The corresponding monthly
13Note that the regional BIL for a month m is also the sum of the BIL
region









































0time series are reported in Appendix E.
From Figure 8, we see that BIL ranks the currencies as the other indicators: EURUSD is the
most liquid, then come USDJPY and EURJPY. Like the spread indicator, BIL ranks the regions 4-1-
2-3 (USA, Asia, Europe, Europe/USA) for EURUSD and EURJPY and 4-3-2-1 (USA, Europe/USA,
Europe, Asia) for USDJPY from illiquid to liquid. Moreover, BIL shows a regular improvement of
the liquidity conditions until the drastic deterioration of the end of the sample. Overall, it seems that
BIL is less volatile than the other indicators while it reacts more strongly to the crisis episode.
To compare this BIL indicator with the previous ones, we consider sample correlations between
indicators as it is often the case in the literature (Amihud (2002) or Sadka (2006)). The following
table presents correlations for the three considered currencies.
BILt/EURUSD BILt/EURJPY BILt/USDJPY
Srelative
i,t 0.95 0.72 0.96
Ni,t 0.58 0.20 0.35
Vi,t -0.01 0.05 0.01
ILLIQi,t 0.79 0.81 0.81
Table 4: Correlation between liquidity indicators and BIL (2000-2009) for each currency pair
On the one hand, table 4 shows low correlations between BIL and the number of transaction and
BIL and the volume. On the other one, the correlations between BIL and the two others indicators
are large and even reaching 0.96. This ﬁrst result suggests that the BIL indicator accurately measures
liquidity. These results are particularly interesting as the BIL indicator relies solely on price data for
its computation and does not rely on volume data as opposed to the Amihud (2002) one. Further-
more, as explained above, the BIL indicator measures a cost and is not affected by the shortcomings
of measures such as spread and ILLIQ.
3.3.4. Robustness check
Sensitivy test on the BIL indicator One main hypothesis to compute our new BIL indicator is the
deﬁnition of the information horizon. In the previous section, we consider the end of the day as the





































































with Nh is the number of trades for region h, H is the number of regions and rJ the return over
the entire day J. In this formula, we consider 1 l[rJ<0] as the dummy variable. However, in the second



























where rh is the return over the region h, using 1 l[rh<0] as the dummy variable.
From a quantitative point of view, it appears that the two BIL are very close14. Notably, it does
not change the correlations (as reported in appendix G) with the other indicators.
Comparison of liquidity indicators between electronic platforms. One main issue for liquidiy analysis
is the degree of order fragmentation between several alternative platforms. In the case of our three
exchange rates, two electronic platforms may be considered: EBS and Reuters D-3000. These two
platforms do not present the same degree of expost trade transparency, or at least data availibility
on traded volumes for example. One advantage of BIL is computable from from the only price serie,
and without volumes, even if, as mentionned previously, it ends up to be very close to the Amihud
trade-impact measure.
The two electronic platform EBS and Reuters D-3000 tend to be specialized in speciﬁc FX parities
even if few trades hold in both platforms for EURUSD in particular. As a consequence, the degree of
liquidity for EURUSD on Reuters D-3000 is by far lower than the one on EBS platforms. We expect
our indicator to reﬂect this platform segmentation and the low degree of liquidity even for the same
currency pair. To compare the liquidity conditions for EURUSD on the two electronic platforms, we
compute the relative spread, the BIL indicator as well as the number of trades for the period January
2005- May 2009. Graphs are reported in appendix G.
The number of trades on EBS is, on average, sixteen times the number of trades on Reuters









































0D-3000. Over the sample, this proportion has clearly increased during the turmoil in 2007 and in
the 2008 crisis. This relates to the higher concentration of trades during crises. In particular, when
liquidityisscarceontheglobalmarket, tradesconcentrateonthemostliquidplatformmarginalizing
the less liquid ones. This is further conﬁrmed by the two other indicators. Even if on average, the
spread on D-3000 is only three times the one on EBS, during the turmoil this has increased up to
22. This gap between the two spreads for the same currency pair, during a period of scarce liquidity
clearly illustrates this concentration principle of liquidity. Turning to our new BIL indicator, it also
appears very sensitive to this crisis-liquidity-concentration dynamic. On average the BIL on D-3000
is 12 times as big as the EBS one, and is also nearly 55 times the one on EBS during the crisis. We note
that our indicator is the most sensitive to this liquidity gap between the two platforms, especially
during crisis episodes. In this sense, it appears also quite accurate to illustrate the fragmentation
impact of liquidity between trading platforms during crisis episodes.
4. DETECTION OF LIQUIDITY CRISIS ON THE FX MARKET: A SIGNAL APPROACH
4.1. Signal methodology
Inthissection, wetesttheaccuracyofourmeasurestodetectliquidityproblemsintheFXmarket.
Moreover, we screen liquidity problems to better understand the impact accross currencies and in
time. In order to do so, we consider the main ﬁnancial crises that have occured during our complete
sample, January 2000 to December 2009. For the ﬁrst part of our sample, we rely on the identiﬁcation
of crisis periods proposed by Rigobon (2003). In his paper, Rigobon identify the following crises :
the Internet Crash (March 2000 - May 2000), the Argentinean crisis (October 2000 - December 2001),
September 11, 2001 and the WorldCom accounting problems crises (June 2002 - October 2002)15. We
complete the sample by considering the ﬁnancial turmoil that started in 2007. Concerning these
events, we could identiﬁed three episodes: the 2007 subprime mortgage crisis (August 2007 - Janu-
ary 2008), the Bear Stern problem and the global ﬁnancial crisis that was triggered by the Lehman
Brother failure (September 2008 - November 2008).
From a methodological point of view, we caracterize a liquidity problem as abnormal values of
our liquidity measures. Abnormal values lie outside the 95% quantile. As shown in Figures 5 and 6,
the volume and the number of trades are upward trended which reﬂects the development and the










































0specialization of the EBS platform for this three currencies. Furthermore, variables such as the rel-
ative spread show some downward trends during the ﬁrst part of our sample for all the currencies
indicating the improvement of liquidity conditions on the EBS platform. In fact, at the beginning of
the sample, the EBS platform was not widely used which could introduce a bias in our analysis. To
account for trends in liquidity measures observations, we calculate 4 years - moving quantiles16. For
the Amihud, BIL and the spreads measures a deterioration of liquidity conditions is unambiguously
a raise of the measures and we take the appropriate 95% quantile. For the number of trades and
the volumes measures, the relation between liquidity dry-ups and the two measures evolutions is
ambiguous as discussed page 12. As a consequence, we select the dates at which these two indi-
cators fall outside the [2.5%-97.5%] quantiles. With such identiﬁcation scheme, extreme values of
the indicators should indicate liquidity tensions on the FX market. This methodology presents some
similarities with the Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1997) signal approach that tries to predict
which countries are more likely to suffer from currency crises.
We ﬁrst analyze to what extent our set of liquidity indicators is useful tool in order to analyze
liquidity problems during ﬁnancial crises identiﬁed by Rigobon (2003) during the early 2000s ; then
we especially focus on the consequences of the ﬁnancial turmoil of 2007-2008.
4.2. Liquidity problems on the FX market during the several crisis of 2000-2002
From Figure 13, we detect liquidity problems for the three exchange rates mainly during the
internet crash and the Sept. 2001 episodes. During the internet crash, the spread indicator computed
on USDJPY signals liquidity problems 31.3% of the time, which corresponds to 20 days out of 64.
The internet crash and the Sept. 2001 events have had global consequences and their impact on
the FX market could be viewed as the consequences of international asset reallocation during these
crises by market participants.
Concerning the Argentinean and the WorldCom crises, the detection appears to be more limited.
However, it should be noted that these periods of crisis are identiﬁed on an extended period of time
(see Figure 13).
Concerning the 2000-2001 period that covers the Internet crash and the Argentinean crisis, the
indicators detect liquidity tensions that are more directly related to FX issues: in particular, our
16Until the ﬁrst of January 2004, the quantile is calculated using all the observations from the ﬁrst of January 2000 to the
last day of december 2003. After that date, we take a 4 years moving quantile. As a consequence, we compute the quantile









































0signalling approach suggest liquidity tensions on the EURUSD during the period September - No-
vember 2000. Such tensions could be related to the several ofﬁcial ECB interventions of September
and November 2000 aiming at reducing the overshoot of the euro. Furthermore, our set of liquidity
indicators suggest very few liquidity problems during 2001, with the exception of September.
Our liquidity indicators detect very few days of liquidity tensions during the WorldCom ac-
counting crisis problem considered on the complete sample (5 month of data). Nevertheless, this
crisis has culminated with the discovering of improper accounting of $3.8 billion in expenses in June
25th, 2002 and the bankruptcy protection that the ﬁrm has ﬁled for one month later (July 21th). Note
that the liquidity indicators show tensions on the USDJPY exchange rate on the 26th and the 28th of
June. Concerning EURUSD, liquidity tensions appear only through the volume and the number of
trades measures. Both of them are signalling problems on June 25th and 26th. The number of trades
and the volumes measures take abnormal values respectively 7 and 8 times between June 25th and
July 24th. No sign of tension are detected on the EURJPY during this period.
4.3. Liquidity problems on the FX market during the ﬁnancial turmoil (2007-2009)
The ﬁnancial crisis that started in the summer of 2007 and intensiﬁed in the fall of 2008 has
exposed ﬁnancial assets to extreme price variations linked to some particular liquidity conditions.
In this section, we analyze to what extent our liquidity indicators are useful tools in order to analyze
how the ﬁnancial turmoil have impacted the liquidity of the FX market. As described by Melvin and
Taylor (2009), the ﬁnancial crisis has affected the FX market through “shocking events” since August
2007. Melvin and Taylor (2009) describe in detail the crisis timeline and the consequences on the FX
market. According to them, four speciﬁc episodes have had signiﬁcant impact on the FX market.
- 16th August 2007: ﬁrst wave of carry trade unwind in relation with the contagion from
other asset classes,
- 7th November 2007: second wave of carry trade unwind,
- March 2008: rumor of Bear Stearns demise,
- September 2008: failure of Lehman Brothers.
Figures 14 to 16 display the BIL and the relative spread indicators aggregated to get daily data for
the period 2007-2009 for the three exchange rates. As mentioned by Melvin and Taylor (2009), ﬁnan-
cial market problems have impacted the FX liquidity through important shocks. The Bear Stearns









































0must note that this surge in illiquidity is short-lived: this contrast with the impact of the Lehman
Brother episode. During this event, we could observe a long-lasting increase in illiquidity that has
started in early September 2008 for the three parities.
Figure 17 in the Appendix displays the results for the 4 selected periods mentionned by Melvin
and Taylor (2009)17.
With our set of liquidity indicators, we are able to detect liquidity problems during the four peri-
ods. In November 2008, liquidity tensions seem concentrated on the JPY parities. Extreme values for
the volumes and the number of trades are detected for these two FX. In particular, the BIL variable
indicates liquidity tensions on USDJPY during two days. Concerning the Bear Stern episode, the BIL
and the volumes indicators are the ﬁrst one to signal tensions on the JPY parities as soon as March
the 7th. Starting on March the 13th, most of the indicators signals liquidity problems for the three
FX. However, concerning EURJPY, the spread indicator sends a signal of liquidity tensions only on
March the 21th, more than 6 working days after the Amihud and the BIL variables.
Concerning the Lehman Brother bankruptcy, the Amihud illiquidity indicator is the ﬁrst to signal
tensions on the EURUSD (since August the 28) and on the USDJPY (on September the 1st). Starting
on September the 3rd and 4th, most of the illiquidity variables take extreme values for the three
FX, suggesting sustained liquidity tensions on the FX market. One must note that the spread, the
Amihud and the BIL indicators have kept extreme values until the end of 2008 for the three FX con-
sidered, indicating that the liquidity tensions on the FX market have been long-lasting (see Figures
14 to 16). This may suggest some freeze in international operations and a country segmentation due
to the high degree of uncertainty.
5. CONCLUSION
The aim of the paper is to understand the role, if any, of liquidity in the FX market. Even though
this market is one of the most liquid one, our analysis highlights that liquidity problems have oc-
curred during the last decade for the three major exchange rates (EURUSD, USDJPY and EURJPY),
and should not be ignored. Several important results are put in light in our paper.
First, the trading organisation of the FX market has substantially changed during the last 15 years
moving from a bilateral OTC market, to the intensive used of electronic trading platforms such as
17In Figure 17, the marker 1 indicates that the liquidity indicator falls into the 95% empirical quantile (the marker -1 used









































0EBS. This migration to a centralized electronic trading scheme has several implications concerning
the FX market functioning and allow for a monitoring of liquidity conditions and its impact on the
price discovery process.
Second, we rely on several standard liquidity indicators - spread, number of transactions, vol-
umes and Amihud - to get an assessment about liquidity dynamics in the FX market. We complete
the picture by proposing a new liquidity indicator that meets all the criteria that a liquidity indicator
should fulﬁlled. This new indicator (BIL) is close to a market impact, with the main advantages of
relying only on price data for its computation, and being directly comparable between currencies.
One must note that this indicator is statistically close to the relative spread and the Amihud indi-
cators, meaning that even if this indicator is based on traded prices, it is close to order based and
volume based measures.
All the indicators we use show a general improvement of liquidity between 2000 and the begin-
ning of 2007 on the three exchange rates considered. However, such global evolution could be hit
by isolated liquidity problems (accidents) that affect punctually speciﬁc exchange rates. From our
results, it appears that the EURUSD is the most liquid exchange rate, followed by the USDJPY and
then the EURJPY, but that USDJPY exchange rate seems to be the most driven by liquidity condi-
tions. Furthermore, from an intraday point of view, liquidity variables have a speciﬁc pattern in
relation with the opening business hours: regions where European only and European-American
ﬁnancial markets are open are the most liquid one (and therefore the most immune against liquidity
problems).
Finally, from our signal approach methodology, it appears that liquidity tensions have occurred
during several ﬁnancial crisis of the last decade and our measures are able to capture them. In
particular, the main events that have had signiﬁcant impacts on the liquidity of the EURUSD and
the EURJPY during the last decade have been: the internet crash, September 2001, Bear Stearns and
the Lehman Bother failure. USDJPY have been impacted by the same set of events and also by the
WorldCom accounting problems. Focusing on the turmoil that started in 2007, several indicators -
the relative spread, the Amihud ILLIQ and our BIL indicator - point out liquidity problems for the
three exchange rates. However, for some speciﬁc events, like August 2007, Amihud and our BIL
indicators are able to detect tensions on the FX market contrary to the relative spread. Nevertheless,









































0easily available for FX markets than volume data; as a consequence, it seems particularly ﬁtted to
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0Appendix A. Evolution of the FX market:
1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007
US Dollar 82.0 83.3 87.3 90.3 88.7 86.3
Euro . . . 37.6 37.2 37.0
Deutsche Mark 39.6 36.1 30.1 . . .
French Franc 3.8 7.9 5.1 . . .
Japanese Yen 23.4 24.1 20.2 22.7 20.3 16.5
Pound Sterling 13.6 9.4 11.0 13.2 16.9 15.0
Swiss Franc 8.4 7.3 7.1 6.1 6.1 6.8
Australian Dollar 2.5 2.7 3.1 4.2 5.5 6.7
Canadian Dollar 3.3 3.4 3.6 4.5 4.2 4.2
Table A-1: Currency distribution of foreign exchange market turnovers (percentage shares of average daily turnover), source BIS 2007.
1995 1998 2001 2004 2007
Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount %
With reporting dealers 728 64 908 64 689 59 936 53 1319 43
With other ﬁnancial insti-
tutions
230 20 279 20 329 28 585 33 1235 40
With non-ﬁnancial insti-
tutions
179 16 242 17 156 13 252 14 527 17
Total 1137 100 1429 101 1174 100 1773 100 3081 100
Local 526 46 657 46 499 43 674 38 1185 38
Cross-Border 613 54 772 54 674 57 1099 62 1896 62









































0Appendix B. Dataset example from EBS trading platform recordings.
line date time currency type bid price offer price bid size offer size
1 02-Apr-09 15:00:06 AUD/USD P 0.717 0.717 3 1
2 02-Apr-09 15:00:06 EUR/JPY P 133.73 133.78 1 1
3 02-Apr-09 15:00:06 EUR/JPY D . 133.77 . 1
4 02-Apr-09 15:00:06 GBP/JPY P 146.59 146.65 1 1
5 02-Apr-09 15:00:06 GBP/USD P 1.474 1.474 1 1
6 02-Apr-09 15:00:06 USD/CHF P 1.133 1.134 1 6
7 02-Apr-09 15:00:06 USD/JPY P 99.48 99.49 5 1
8 02-Apr-09 15:00:06 XAG/USD P 12.76 12.808 50 50
9 02-Apr-09 15:00:07 AUD/JPY P 71.29 71.32 1 1
10 02-Apr-09 15:00:07 AUD/USD P 0.717 0.717 3 1
11 02-Apr-09 15:00:07 BKT/RUB P . 38.54 0 3
12 02-Apr-09 15:00:07 EUR/CHF D 1.524 . 1 .
13 02-Apr-09 15:00:07 EUR/JPY P 133.73 133.78 1 2
14 02-Apr-09 15:00:07 EUR/RUB P 44.875 44.945 5 5
15 02-Apr-09 15:00:07 EUR/USD P 1.345 1.345 6 2
16 02-Apr-09 15:00:07 GBP/JPY P 146.59 146.66 1 1
17 02-Apr-09 15:00:07 USD/CHF P 1.133 1.134 5 10
18 02-Apr-09 15:00:07 USD/CHF D 1.133 . 1 .
19 02-Apr-09 15:00:07 USD/JPY P 99.48 99.49 6 1
20 02-Apr-09 15:00:08 EUR/GBP P 0.912 0.913 1 1
21 02-Apr-09 15:00:08 EUR/JPY P 133.73 133.78 1 1
22 02-Apr-09 15:00:08 EUR/USD P 1.345 1.345 6 3
23 02-Apr-09 15:00:08 GBP/JPY P 146.59 146.65 1 1
24 02-Apr-09 15:00:08 GBP/USD P 1.474 1.474 1 1
25 02-Apr-09 15:00:08 USD/CAD P 1.244 1.245 1 5
26 02-Apr-09 15:00:08 USD/CHF D 1.133 . 1 .
27 02-Apr-09 15:00:08 USD/JPY P 99.48 99.49 1 1
28 02-Apr-09 15:00:08 USD/JPY D 99.48 . 5 .
29 02-Apr-09 15:00:08 USD/MXN P 13.808 13.823 1 1
30 02-Apr-09 15:00:08 XAG/USD P 12.76 12.808 100 50
31 02-Apr-09 15:00:09 AUD/JPY P 71.29 71.34 1 1
32 02-Apr-09 15:00:09 AUD/USD P 0.717 0.717 1 1
33 02-Apr-09 15:00:09 EUR/JPY P 133.75 133.8 1 28
34 02-Apr-09 15:00:09 EUR/USD P 1.345 1.345 5 1
35 02-Apr-09 15:00:09 EUR/USD D 1.345 . 1 .
36 02-Apr-09 15:00:09 GBP/JPY P 146.58 146.67 1 1
37 02-Apr-09 15:00:09 GBP/USD P 1.473 1.474 1 2
38 02-Apr-09 15:00:09 USD/CHF P 1.133 1.134 5 9
39 02-Apr-09 15:00:09 USD/JPY P 99.49 99.5 2 18
40 02-Apr-09 15:00:09 USD/JPY D 99.49 99.49 2 1
41 02-Apr-09 15:00:09 XAG/USD P 12.755 12.8 100 50









































0Appendix C. Regional segmentation of FX trading activity
FIG. 2 Regional segmentation on FX markets
EURJPY EURUSD
USDJPY






































































































































































































































0Appendix E. Correlation between liquidity indicators.
Srelative
i,t Ni,t Vi,t ILLIQi,t
Srelative
i,t 1 0.42 -0.18 0.84
Ni,t 1 0.77 0.26
Vi,t 1 -0.32
ILLIQi,t 1
Table E.1: Correlation between liquidity indicators (2000-2009) for EURUSD
Srelative
i,t Ni,t Vi,t ILLIQi,t
Srelative
i,t 1 -0.34 -0.43 0.88
Ni,t 1 0.98 -0.17
Vi,t 1 -0.28
ILLIQi,t 1
Table E.2: Correlation between liquidity indicators (2000-2009) for EURJPY
Srelative
i,t Ni,t Vi,t ILLIQi,t
Srelative
i,t 1 0.21 -0.16 0.86
Ni,t 1 0.91 -0.01
Vi,t 1 -0.32
ILLIQi,t 1

































































































FIG. 9 BIL statistics, by currency and by region










































































































































































0FIG. 13 Identiﬁcation of liquidity problems during identiﬁed crisis (2000-2002)
Day proportion of liquidity problems during crisis episodes as defined by Rigobon (2003)
USDJPY
Number of 'crisis 
days' 
spread amihud bil volume nb_trade
Internet Crash 64 31,3% 39,1% 39,1% 4,7% 4,7%
Argentinean crisis 301 4,3% 2,7% 2,0% 3,7% 4,0%
September 2001 14 57,1% 64,3% 57,1% 14,3% 14,3%
World Com acc. Pb. 108 2,8% 1,9% 1,9% 7,4% 9,3%
EURUSD
Number of 'crisis 
days' 
spread amihud bil volume nb_trade
Internet Crash 64 6,3% 18,5% 20,0% 4,6% 4,6%
Argentinean crisis 301 8,9% 6,6% 4,9% 3,0% 3,6%
September 2001 14 28,6% 42,9% 42,9% 7,1% 7,1%
World Com acc. Pb. 108 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 12,0% 8,3%
EURJPY
Number of 'crisis 
days' 
spread amihud bil volume nb_trade
Internet Crash 64 27,0% 33,3% 30,2% 3,2% 3,2%
Argentinean crisis 301 4,0% 3,0% 2,7% 6,6% 7,0%
September 2001 14 42,9% 28,6% 42,9% 21,4% 14,3%
World Com acc. Pb. 108 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,6% 5,6%
Day proportion of liquidity problems outside crisis episodes as defined by Rigobon (2003)
spread amihud bil volume nb_trade
USDJPY 6,5% 5,0% 5,0% 8,8% 9,6%
spread amihud bil volume nb_trade
USDJPY 6,5% 5,0% 5,0% 8,8% 9,6%
EURUSD 9,6% 7,3% 8,5% 5,4% 6,9%

























































Sept. 2008: Lehman Brother failure
March 2008: Bear Stern
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Sept. 2008: Lehman Brother failure March 2008: Bear Stern
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Sept. 2008: Lehman Brother failure
March 2008: Bear Stern


























































































































































































Relative spread (left scale) BIL (right scale)









































0FIG. 17 Detection of liquidity problems on the FX market -2007-2008 (selected episodes)
EURUSD EURJPY USDJPY
spread amihud bil vol. trades spread amihud bil vol. trades spread amihud bil vol. trades
09/08/2007 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
10/08/2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
13/08/2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
14/08/2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
15/08/2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
16/08/2007 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
17/08/2007 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
20/08/2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
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